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 Throughout our nation’s legal history, the problem of how to ensure 
sound expertise in trials involving scientific issues has persisted. From the 
early nineteenth century, when party-affiliated scientists became fixtures in the 
courtroom, accusations of biased experts, overconfident testimony, and in-
competent “junk” expertise were common.1 Provincially, perhaps, we identify 
the 1993 Daubert opinion2 as a watershed, but the discourse and concerns 
about reliability highlighted in Daubert were decades old.3 Nevertheless, a 
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 1. See generally David S. Caudill, Arsenic and Old Chemistry: Images of Mad Alchemists, 
Experts Attacking Experts, and the Crisis in Forensic Science, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1 (2009). 
 2. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (requiring judges 
to be gatekeepers to ensure reliable expert testimony in federal trials). 
 3. See, e.g., SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING: AN EXPLORATORY 
DISCUSSION (J.D. Nyhart ed., 1981) (edited transcript of the proceedings of the Conference on the 
Use of Scientific and Technical Evidence in Formal Judicial Proceedings, held Sept. 23–24, 1977). 
Chief Justice Howard Markey remarked at the conference, “I think that judges can become ‘com-
fortable’ with science or scientists if they know more about how they operate . . . . [T]here has 
been this notion that science is beyond us, in another world entirely, and that we cannot handle it. I 
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transformation of admissibility standards for expert evidence in federal and 
many state courts indeed began with Daubert and continued as those standards 
were adjusted in Joiner,4 Kumho Tire,5 and revisions to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.6 An extraordinary volume of commentary appeared in the wake of 
Daubert, and later after Joiner and Kumho Tire, criticizing, explaining and 
evaluating the new gatekeeping role of judges. Currently, in the second decade 
of that regime, scholars continue to assess the impact of Daubert. In the de-
bates concerning how Daubert is working, one of the major points of conten-
tion is whether judicial gatekeeping unwittingly prevents jury trials and, 
thereby, disproportionately affects plaintiffs.7 
 Carl F. Cranor’s Toxic Torts: Science, Law, and the Possibility of Justice8 
is a sustained, comprehensive argument that the Daubert gatekeeping regime 
has tilted the playing field against injured plaintiffs in toxic tort litigation. 
More generally, Cranor joins those who argue that the Daubert regime has not 
fared well in practice. Complex scientific evidence is not handled well in trials 
because scientific methods, data, and inferential reasoning are not well under-
stood by gatekeeping judges.9 Cranor’s goal is to help solve this problem by 
offering a detailed description of the patterns of reasoning, evidence collec-
tion, and inference in nonlegal scientific settings. While numerous legal schol-
ars are engaged in the tasks of criticizing and improving the Daubert regime, 
Cranor brings a unique perspective. Apart from the usual advantages of a 
book-length analysis in terms of detail, Cranor is a philosopher with a Master 
of Studies in Law from Yale University and a substantial scientific back-
                                                                                                           
just do not buy that idea.” Id. at 12. Thus, one of the main arguments of many recent publications, 
including the book here reviewed, that judges need to understand more about science and how it 
“operates,” reflects a concern over thirty years old. 
 4. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997) (holding that abuse-of-discretion 
is the appropriate standard for review of admissibility decisions). 
 5. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999) (holding that the Daubert 
standards for reliability apply to all expert, and not simply scientific, testimony). 
 6. FED. R. EVID. 702–703 (revised in 2000 explicitly to follow Daubert). 
 7. See, e.g., Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Carey, Daubert and the Disappearing Jury Trial, 69 
U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 306 (2007) (the “aggressive invocation of the judge’s new role as guardian 
of the purity of scientific evidence has had a disproportionate impact on plaintiffs.”). See also John 
H. Mansfield, An Embarrassing Episode in the History of the Law of Evidence, 34 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 77, 78–84 (2003) (Daubert leads judges to invade the province of the jury, an error with 
constitutional dimensions). 
 8. CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 
(2006). 
 9. See, e.g., Andrew W. Jurs, Judicial Analysis of Complex and Cutting-Edge Science in the 
Daubert Era: Epidemiologic Risk Assessment as a Test Case for Reform Strategies, 42 CONN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001 
&context=andrew_jurs (weaknesses of the Daubert regime include weak judicial training in 
scientific principles and statistical information). See also David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, 
Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 475–
76 (2008) (judicial review of complex science is problematic and not in accord with scientific 
practices). 
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ground that includes (i) a stint as a consultant for the United States Congress 
Office of Technology Assessment, where he coauthored Identifying and 
Regulating Carcinogens (1987), (ii) service on science advisory panels and 
National Academy of Science Committees, and (iii) experience as a law firm 
consultant and an expert witness in toxic tort cases.  
 By way of summary, one can identify seven major themes in Toxic Torts: 
 1. Due to the complexity of legal processes and scientific evidence, the 
transformation in tort law engendered by Daubert is not visible to the public, 
who may not know that pretrial hearings are eliminating many personal in-
jury suits before trial.10 
 2. The perception of a crisis in tort law, the tort reform movement, the 
perceived danger of overdeterrence, the allegedly frequent appearance of 
charlatans peddling junk science in court, and the sound science movement, 
all converged in the 1980s and early 1990s to create a concern over standards 
for admissibility of experts.11 However, many judges in the post-Daubert era 
hold views of science that are out of sync with the views of scientists them-
selves.12 When two experts disagree, many judges wrongly believe one of 
them must be a junk scientist.13 Judges also tend to adopt oversimplified rules 
or heuristics, such as requiring epidemiological studies to establish causa-
tion.14 These trends allow tort defendants to win cases by manufacturing 
doubt and uncertainty.15 
 3. Gatekeeping judges need to have a better understanding of science, 
including (i) the way scientists communicate, including “hedging”16 for ex-
ample, (ii) the well-established and widely utilized patterns of inferences to 
the best explanation, using all relevant information, (iii) the legitimate dis-
agreements between scientists, (iv) the various types of evidence and the in-
ferences they support when combined, (v) the way animal studies and 
chemical-structure studies are used in science, (vi) the regularity of Joiner- 
 
 
 
                                                                                                           
 10. CRANOR, supra note 8, at 1–7. 
 11. Id. at 46–47. The perceived danger of overdeterrence is that “useful technologies would 
be driven from the market and U.S. industry rendered less competitive in international markets, as 
it has been alleged that physicians have been driven from medical practice by . . . malpractice 
suits.” Id. at 47. 
 12. Id. at 335 (“courts [implementing Daubert] can place overly restrictive, unscientific 
constraints on scientific inferences”). “Courts need to become more sophisticated about the scien-
tific issues in toxic torts . . . to better ensure that verdicts comport with the science needed in a 
case, that there are fair admissibility reviews, and that there is the possibility of justice for injured 
parties.” Id. at 337. 
 13. Id. at 147 (“scientists may well disagree about the importance or significance of each 
kind of evidence . . . and . . . there may be quite legitimate disagreements within a community of 
respectable, conscientious scientists about the toxicity of particular substances”). 
 14. Id. at 224–27. 
 15. Id. at 206–07. 
 16. Id. at 192–99. Expressions of tentativeness, or hedging (for example, “it seems that,” “it 
could be suggested that”), are endemic in science, but “[j]udges should not be misled by scientifi-
cally hedged language and permit it to be exploited for legal purposes.” Id. at 201. 
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type gaps17 in nondeductive reasoning, and (vii) the routine practices of con-
sensus committees and peer review, which are not as restrictive as some 
judges imagine. Courts also need to be aware of the limitations of testing and 
evidence in the regulatory realm and how to recognize limitations (as agen-
cies do) without declaring an absence of evidence.18 
 4. Judicial misunderstanding of science interferes with the tort system’s 
goal of corrective justice.19 The system is now tilted against plaintiffs, and 
the rules of evidence often serve as barriers to credible claims—ending toxic 
tort claims before trial, helping defendants win on summary judgment, and 
further advantaging defendants on appeal with a weak abuse-of-discretion 
standard.20 Moreover, Justice Breyer’s concern in Joiner21 with keeping 
products on the market (that is, his concern that “tort law not falsely condemn 
nonharmful substances . . . .”) exacerbates the effect of conventional scien-
tific concerns with false positives.22 To ensure that both sides in a trial get a 
fair hearing, and that cross-examination can work as it should, judges should 
admit all scientific testimony that “is within the range of opinion where ex-
perts might reasonably differ on a scientific issue even though the evidence is 
shaky.”23  
 5. There are too many risky products on the market, not enough premar-
ket screening procedures, too few studies, and insufficient postmarket reme-
dies.24 Uncertainty regarding toxicity is rampant because risks of harm are 
difficult to detect with precision. Problems include latency periods, rare dis-
eases that make studies difficult, widespread diseases whose causes are hard 
                                                                                                           
 17. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144–46 (expert testimony is inadmissible if 
there is “too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”); see CRANOR, 
supra note 8, at 153 (“every nondeductive argument will have some gap between premises and 
conclusion. We might say that gaps are irremovable . . ..”; id. at 82 (gaps are “an endemic feature 
of nondeductive arguments . . ..”). “Nondeductive” arguments, in contrast to deductive arguments 
in mathematics and formal logic, are arguments “whose conclusions are not guaranteed by their 
premises,” and include diagnostic induction, differential diagnosis, and inferences to the best 
explanation. See id. at 78.  
 18. CRANOR, supra note 8, at 160–66.  
 19. Id. at 31–33, 83–90. 
 20. Id at 83 (“features of toxic substances and recent rulings on the admissibility of evidence 
increase citizens’ difficulties in obtaining access to the law and both increase the tilt in process 
against them.”). 
 21. 522 U.S. at 148–49 (Breyer, J., concurring) (gatekeeper judges need to ensure that “the 
powerful engine of tort liability . . . points toward the right substances and does not destroy the 
wrong ones.”). 
 22. CRANOR, supra note 8, at 89. 
Scientists are typically quite demanding in preventing factual false positives, that is, their proce-
dures are designed to minimize study results that show that a substance has a toxic property when in 
fact it does not. . . . Although this is appropriate for theoretical scientific research, it risks problems 
in other institutional contexts, such as . . . in either the regulatory or tort law that have different 
mistake norms. . . . [The] epistemic norms implicit in science, do not protect as well against factual 
false negatives [i.e., results that show a substance has no toxic properties when indeed it does] . . . . 
Such errors can have substantial effects on the legal interests of litigants. 
Id. at 214. 
 23. Id. at 289 (paraphrasing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999) (ex-
pert testimony must not go outside the “range where experts might reasonably differ, . . . even 
though the evidence is ‘shaky.’”)).  
 24. Id. at 160–70. 
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to determine, lack of signature effects, and distribution errors.25 Although 
“[j]udges cannot change the pace of discovery . . . , they can have a more re-
alistic view of the availability of evidence, change what they expect of it and 
modify how they treat the evidence before them.”26 
 6. Defendants too easily exploit uncertainties in studies of toxicity and, 
in the process, construct an idealized image of scientific knowledge that is at 
odds with the scientific community.27 
 7. Kumho Tire represents a plausible approach, (only) requiring of court-
room experts the same level of rigor that exists in their respective fields.28 
Whether this approach has penetrated the federal courts, however, is not 
clear, and even when it is adopted, it is troubling to see how easy it is to ex-
aggerate the “rigor” required.29 
 Cranor supports the foregoing arguments in a manner not conveyed by my 
brief summation. He does so with a great deal of research, detailed explana-
tions of scientific methodologies (epidemiology, statistics, animal studies, 
chemical-structure analysis, and case studies) and of their limitations, and 
careful examination of numerous judicial opinions and the expertise in each of 
those cases that was reviewed for admissibility. Indeed, the value of this book 
for those in law is its scientific orientation from beginning to end. Cranor pro-
vides lawyers and judges with the crucial understanding of how science works 
by explaining how studies are conducted, how evidence is integrated, and how 
inferences are made. 
 In the debates concerning Daubert and appropriate admissibility stan-
dards, some have argued that scientific standards are too low for the legal 
context—that is, “a legal decision should be on even firmer ground than a 
result in the scientific field itself.”30 Such a position results in the construction 
of a “legal science” at odds with existing science and an oscillating tendency 
(i) to allow the testimony of experts who exaggerate their confidence level and 
(ii) to exclude good experts who concede the pragmatic aspects of their prac-
tices.31 On the other hand, some commentators argue that existing scientific 
                                                                                                           
 25. Id. at 170–81. 
 26. Id. at 203. 
 27. Id. at 270–72. 
 28. Id. at 289–91 (discussing Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152–53). 
 29. “That is, if courts insist that scientific reasoning must comport with the most rigorous 
reasoning in the fields of the typical toxicological sciences, this would be a mistake in the tort 
law.” Id.at 74. 
 30. Id. at 52 (discussing language in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 
579, 597 (1993)). Cranor notes that the Court “strangely” suggests that “the science admitted into 
legal cases should be more certain than the scientific studies that provide the foundation for future 
scientific developments.” Id. 
 31. See DAVID S. CAUDILL & L. H. LARUE, NO MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZATION OF 
SCIENCE IN LAW 15–47 (2006). See also Soldo v. Sandoz Pharmaceutical Corp., 244 F.Supp. 2d 
434, 505 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (stating: 
[While] it is sometimes necessary in a clinical, regulatory, or business practice to make decisions 
based on less than sufficient and/or reliable scientific evidence due to practical demands requiring 
immediate decision-making, such guesses, although perhaps reasonable hypotheses based on the 
best available evidence, do not constitute a scientifically reliable approach when used to assess cau-
sality via the scientific method.).  
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standards are too high for law and that experts should be allowed to testify in 
favor of causation, even if science has not established causation.32 This posi-
tion likewise constructs a “legal science” at odds with the scientific enterprise. 
Cranor comes close to making this second error in Toxic Torts when he em-
phasizes the barriers facing plaintiffs and seems to call for lower admissibility 
standards.33 Cranor, however, never says that legal standards should be lower. 
Instead, he demonstrates that actual scientific practices are not as ideal as 
some judges who misunderstand scientific reasoning think they are.34 
 Cranor also comes close to judicial reductionism, identifying the judiciary 
as the site of all problems and solutions—if judges were more scientifically 
literate, all would be well. My own view is that all players in the system con-
tribute to its success or failure. Trial judges need to understand science, but 
juries need to be able to evaluate expertise, lawyers need to be ethical, experts 
need to resist advocacy, and appellate courts need to reflect upon and correct 
rash decisions.35 Toxic Torts, therefore, seems to suffer from a narrowness of 
focus, but I must concede that one book cannot cover every issue. And 
Cranor’s coverage of the shortcomings of trial and appellate judges, with re-
spect to understanding science, is admirably comprehensive. Moreover, 
Cranor is not unaware of the important role of attorneys—he is highly critical 
of defense attorneys who construct an idealized image of science for the trial 
judge.36 Cranor might have emphasized as well the importance of understand-
ing science for plaintiffs’ counsel, who need to learn to construct a more real-
istic view of science for trial judges. In fairness, Cranor hints at this 
recommendation every time he qualifies his criticism of a defense verdict or 
summary judgment in a particular toxic tort case by speculating that the plain-
tiff’s attorney may not have done a very good job.37 Cranor also identifies an 
important role for juries. He cites to jury studies establishing that juries can 
handle complex scientific issues—he, therefore, rejects the notion that admis-
sibility standards must be tightened to prevent jurors from being so easily 
fooled by scientifically sounding junk.38 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                           
 32. See, e.g., Neil B. Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role in Civil Litigation and the Abdication of 
Legal Values in Favor of Scientific Values, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 943, 949, 962 (2003). 
 33. CRANOR, supra note 8, at 157–204. 
 34. Id. at 205–82. 
 35. See CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 31, at 64–75.  
 36. CRANOR, supra, note 8, at 270–72. 
 37. Id. at 20 (“perhaps plaintiffs’ attorneys and their experts could have explained the issues 
better”); id. at 325 (“the court appeared not to understand, or plaintiffs failed to explain well, the 
significance of the . . . studies.”). 
 38. Id. at 71. 
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 Cranor is at his best explaining the virtues and limitations of epidemiol-
ogical studies, the seeming gold standard for toxicological evidence.39 In ex-
plicating those limitations, Cranor acknowledges, but does not adequately 
develop, the “social side to the search for causation.”40 The social side in-
cludes shared goals for health and medical treatments and the social nature of 
consensus committees and their collective scientific judgments.41 While some 
judges might hold an idealized view of the scientific enterprise as somehow 
avoiding subjectivity, Cranor explains that there is ample room for scientific 
judgments, differing interpretations of data, conflicting explanations of phe-
nomena, and inconsistent conclusions.42 Unfortunately, Cranor only empha-
sizes the “total scientific and personal experience” of the individual scientist—
the “background knowledge”43 and “understanding of the issues”44—that influ-
ence a scientific judgment. A richer conception of the social, acknowledging 
that each individual scientist’s experience, background, and understanding are 
tied to a community with shared norms, institutional affiliations, and rhetorical 
conventions, would have been beneficial to the reader.45 Cranor’s effort to 
construct a less idealized and more realistic image of science and to reveal the 
uncertainties and disagreements in the field of toxicology would have benefit-
ted from a less individualized account of scientific judgment. 
 Nevertheless, Toxic Torts deserves the attention of judges, lawyers, and 
legal scholars. Cranor’s evaluation that Daubert is not working and that its 
regime is failing in terms of justice is compelling and timely. In chapter 7, 
Cranor argues that Kumho Tire’s aphorisms—(i) that expertise (only) needs to 
reflect the rigor of the field and (ii) that expert testimony (only) needs to stay 
within a range where reasonable experts might disagree—could level the 
playing field for injured plaintiffs if followed. This argument is especially 
effective because Kumho Tire is current law. When the reader reaches the final 
chapter, Chapter 8, the myriad solutions offered seem less realistic. Major 
regulatory reform, including premarket screening, as well as more social con-
cern and outrage, might be too much for which to ask.46 Even more unrealistic, 
                                                                                                           
 39. Id. at 96–105. 
 40. Cranor actually states that “for some scientific research there is a social side to the search 
for causation; this is especially true in medicine.” Id. at 135. Cranor, thereby, misses the opportu-
nity to explore generally the social aspects of the scientific enterprise. See CAUDILL & LARUE, 
supra note 31, at 85–119 (arguing that all of science reflects social, rhetorical, and institutional 
aspects). 
 41. CRANOR, supra note 8, at 135; see also id. at 259 (discussing scientific consensus com-
mittees). 
 42. Id. at 144–52. 
43. Id. at 152. 
44. Id. at 143.  
 45. Cranor, however, does acknowledge “hedging” as an “endemic rhetorical practice of 
scientists,” see id. at 192, which suggests how community norms become part of the social. 
 46. “One possibility would be to have a major overhaul of our legal structure on the regula-
tory side to obtain better scientific information about products and better prevent injuries from 
toxicants. At present [that is, under the Bush administration], there appears to be little political 
will for this alternative.” Id. at 338. Of course, environmental activism may well thrive under the 
Obama administration, and public fear concerning the risks of low-dose toxicity is more evident as 
biomonitoring technologies help create new narratives concerning toxic body burdens. 
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I think, are the prospects for new torts and tort standards or any shift in bur-
dens of proof.47 Finally, there is the suggestion that a return to Frye would 
help solve the problems Cranor identifies.48 But I find that suggestion less than 
compelling because Frye judges often were not deferential and because reli-
ability standards like Daubert’s were already, and continue to be, used in Frye 
jurisdictions. In short, the most powerful arguments in Toxic Torts appear in 
the first seven chapters and not in the panoply of possible, but unlikely, solu-
tions offered in Cranor’s final chapter. 
 Even though there is a substantial canon of books and (thousands of) 
scholarly articles on Daubert and its aftermath, Toxic Torts is an insightful and 
important addition to the literature. Saying that trial judges need to understand 
more about science is far easier than specifying the means to achieve this. By 
focusing on the patterns of methodological conventions, collection of evi-
dence, and inferential reasoning in numerous contexts of toxicological re-
search, Cranor succeeds in his critical reappraisal of the Daubert regime for 
the field of toxic tort litigation. Most importantly, Cranor offers a more prag-
matic, less idealistic, view of the scientific enterprise to counter the practices 
of those judges who reward experts claiming certainty and discredit experts 
who concede the uncertainties of science. 
 
                                                                                                           
 47. Id. at 363–66. 
 48. Id. at 359–63. 
  
